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This lecture addresses the topic of ‘new mechanisms for punishing atrocities
in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (‘NIACs’). I take it as a given that there
are numerous non-international armed conflicts occurring worldwide, including
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Syria and that there will continue to be such
conflicts in the future. I also take it as a given that there are serious atrocities
occurring as a part of those NIACs, including the targeting of civilians; leading
to their death and injury, enslavement, forcible transfers of populations, enforced
disappearances, torture, sexual violence and persecution, just to name a few.
And, finally, I take it as a given that we would like to find a way to deter and to
punish such atrocities.
To that end, my lecture will focus on the value in this context of pursuing
robust action against ‘crimes against humanity’. First, I will begin by indicating
briefly why the concept of crimes against humanity is especially useful when
dealing with NIACs. Secondly, I will indicate that we have had considerable
success in creating international tribunals, notably the International Criminal
Court (‘ICC’), for prosecuting such crimes, but far less success in doing so
through national courts. Thirdly, I will argue that key mechanisms for
developing national capacity for such prosecutions, as well as associated
interstate cooperation, may lie in a new multilateral convention on the prevention
and punishment of crimes against humanity. 1

* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law

School; Special Rapporteur for Crimes against Humanity, United Nations International Law
Commission. These remarks were the opening address at a conference on ‘Non-International
Armed Conflicts (NIAC): Developments and Challenges’ held at Melbourne Law School on
17 March 2015. They draw upon the analysis set forth in my first report to the UN
International Law Commission. See Sean D Murphy, Special Rapporteur, First Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity, UN GAOR, 67th sess, UN Doc
A/CN.4/680 (17 February 2015).
1 For prior arguments in favour of such a convention, see M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘“Crimes
against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention’ (1994) 31 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 457; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Crimes against Humanity: The Case for a
Specialized Convention’ (2010) 9 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 575;
Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Morten Bergsmo and Song Tianying (eds), On the Proposed
Crimes Against Humanity Convention (Torkel Opsahl, 2014).
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CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND NIACS

‘Crimes against humanity’ are crimes that are so heinous — so
horrible — that they are viewed as an attack on the very quality of being human.
Moreover, such crimes are so heinous that they are an attack not just upon the
immediate victims, but also upon all of humanity, and hence the entire
community of humankind has an interest in their punishment. 2
By way of example, the torture of an individual by a government official in
the course of a NIAC is an international crime, but standing alone it is not a
crime against humanity. If that act of torture occurs, however, as a part of a
widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population — perhaps pursuant
to a governmental policy that is targeting thousands of civilians for
torture — then the individual act of torture becomes a crime against humanity. In
essence, when the perpetrator is a part of a broad campaign to do serious harm to
a civilian population, the individual crime becomes even more aggravated and
merits special treatment as a crime against humanity. Such violence is one of the
main concerns that arises in most NIACs.
Although the codification and application of crimes against humanity has led
to some doctrinal divergences, the concept contains a few basic elements that are
common across all formulations:
•

•

•

First, these crimes are international crimes; it matters not whether the
national law of the territory on which the act was committed has
criminalised the conduct.
Secondly, these crimes are directed against a civilian population and
hence, have a certain scale or systematic nature that generally
extends beyond isolated incidents of violence and that are usually
associated with a state or organisational policy.
Thirdly, these crimes concern the most heinous acts of violence and
persecution known to humankind: murder; torture; sexual violence;
and so on.

Two further elements are especially important in the context of NIACs. They
are that:
•

•

Fourthly, these crimes can be committed within the territory of a
single state or can be committed across borders. Thus, these crimes
can arise in the context of either international or non-international
armed conflicts.
Fifthly, these crimes can be committed either by state actors or by
non-state actors, at least when the latter act as part of an
organisational policy to commit the attack. As such, a rebel group
engaged in a NIAC against its government is subject to the
prohibition of these crimes.

Some historical background may help explain the emergence of these
elements. Up until the 20th century, little attention was paid to whether
2 Hannah Arendt characterised the Holocaust as a ‘new crime, the crime against

humanity — in the sense of a crime “against the human status”, or against the very nature of
mankind’. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
(Viking, 1965) 268.
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international law prohibited violence by a government directed against its own
people. Hence, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 addressed conduct
occurring as a part of interstate armed conflicts, but did not address atrocities
inflicted domestically by a government. 3
In the aftermath of World War I, further thought was given to whether
international law regulated such atrocities. In 1919, a special legal commission
advocated for the inclusion of provisions in the Treaty of Versailles 4 on
prosecuting leaders for committing atrocities against their own people, 5 but no
such provisions were ultimately adopted, and no prosecutions for crimes against
humanity ensued.
II

PROSECUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS
A

International and Special Courts or Tribunals

Even so, the seeds were sown for such prosecutions in the aftermath of World
War II. The 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal established at
Nürnberg (‘Nürnberg Charter’) 6 included ‘crimes against humanity’ as a
component of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Nürnberg Charter defined such
crimes in art 6(c) as:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 7

Notice that this definition of crimes against humanity was linked to the
existence of an international armed conflict — the acts only constituted crimes
against humanity if committed ‘in execution of or in connection with’ a crime
against peace or a war crime. In fact, the basic justification at that time for
intruding into matters that traditionally were within the national jurisdiction of a
state was the crime’s connection to interstate armed conflict.
The Nürnberg Tribunal, charged with trying the senior political and military
leaders of the Third Reich, convicted several defendants for crimes against
humanity committed during the war. 8 ‘Crimes against humanity’ were also
3 See, eg, Hague Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,

4

5

6

7
8

opened for signature 29 July 1899 (entered into force 4 September 1900); See, eg, Hague
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18
October 1907, [1910] UKTS 9 (entered into force 26 January 1910).
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of
Versailles), opened for signature 28 June 1919, 2 USTS 43 (entered into force 10 January
1920).
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, ‘Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference’ (29 March 1919)
partially reprinted in (1920) 14 American Journal of International Law 95.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 82 UNTS 279 (signed and entered into force 8 August 1945) annex
(‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’).
Ibid.
See Roger S Clark, ‘Crimes against Humanity at Nuremberg’ in George Ginsburgs and V N
Kudriavtsev (eds), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990)
177.
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included in the 1946 Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal 9 but ultimately no persons
were convicted of such crimes by that tribunal.
There was hope that, in the 1950s, it would be possible to establish a
permanent international criminal court, but the United Nations General
Assembly deferred action, and throughout the period of the Cold War no further
international tribunals were developed.
In 1993, however, the UN Security Council established the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’). 10 Article 5 of the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY
Statute’) included ‘crimes against humanity’ as part of the ICTY’s jurisdiction.
The chapeau of that article reads that the ICTY ‘shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population’. 11
Notice how this language does not require any connection to an international
armed conflict, but does require a connection to an armed conflict. The historical
record indicates that the drafters were interested in having crimes against
humanity in the former Yugoslavia prosecuted whether or not that conflict was
ultimately characterised by the tribunal as international in character. Hence, the
ICTY Statute established a definitive break from the Nürnberg Charter so as to
take account of crimes against humanity in a NIAC.
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute then proceeds to list several crimes, such as
murder, extermination and enslavement. Through its extensive jurisprudence, the
ICTY also developed important guidance as to exactly what must be proven
when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity. Ultimately, a large
number of defendants before the ICTY were successfully convicted of such
crimes. 12
In 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’). 13 Article 3 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR Statute’) established ‘crimes against humanity’ as
part of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 14 Although art 3 retained the same list of
proscribed acts as existed for the ICTY, the chapeau’s language abandoned any
nexus to armed conflict. Like the ICTY, the jurisprudence of the ICTR provides
important guidance as to what must be proven when prosecuting an individual

9 See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, TIAS 1589 (proclaimed 19 January

1946, amended 26 April 1946) art 5(c).
10 See SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th sess, 3217th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993).
11 See SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th sess, 3453rd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/955 (8 November 1994).
12 Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age’ (2013) 107 American

Journal of International Law 334, 342–6.
13 See SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th sess, 3453rd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/955 (8 November 1994).
14 Ibid annex (‘Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’) art 3.
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for crimes against humanity. And here, too, many defendants before the ICTR
were convicted of such crimes. 15
As is well-known, negotiations in the late 1990s led to the adoption in 1998 of
the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC. 16 Article 5 of the Rome Statute includes
crimes against humanity within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Article 7(1) defines what
is meant by a ‘crime against humanity’: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, “crime
against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack’.
Article 7(1) then proceeds to list a series of acts: murder; extermination;
enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape or other forms
of sexual violence; persecution; enforced disappearance; the crime of apartheid;
and other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering. 17
Article 7(2) provides a series of definitions, the first of which is especially
important. 18 Article 7(2)(a) defines an ‘[a]ttack directed against any civilian
population’ as meaning: ‘[A] course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population,
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack’. 19
One thing to note about this definition is that, like the ICTR Statute, there is
no requirement that the underlying acts be in connection with an ‘international
armed conflict’, nor even any requirement that they be in connection with an
‘armed conflict’. So atrocities committed within a NIAC are fully covered.
Another thing to note is that the words ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
or organizational policy to commit such an attack’ (emphasis added)
contemplate crimes against humanity perpetrated by non-state perpetrators.
Jurisprudence from the ICC suggests that ‘organizational’ includes any
organisation or group with the capacity and resources to plan and carry out a
widespread or systematic attack. For example, the ICC indicted for crimes
against humanity Germain Katanga, who was the leader of an armed militia
operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) known as the
Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri. In referring to the policy requirement for the
crime, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga case stated: ‘Such a policy may be
made either by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any
organisation with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack

15 Sadat, above n 12, 346–9. See also Stephan Meseke, ‘La contribution de la jurisprudence

16
17
18
19

des tribunaux pénaux internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda à la concrétisation
de l’incrimination du crime contre l’humanité [The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the
Criminalisation of Crimes Against Humanity]’ in Mario Chiavario (ed), La justice pénale
internationale entre passé et avenir [International Justice Criminal between the Past and the
Future] (Dalloz, 2004) 173.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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against a civilian population’. 20 So this, too, is an important feature of crimes
against humanity for NIACs, where there is invariably a non-state actor group
involved in the conflict.
Since entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002, several defendants
have been indicted and some convicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity.
For example, in March 2014, the ICC Trial Chamber II issued its judgment that
Katanga committed murder, through other persons, as a crime against humanity
during an attack in February 2003 on a village in the DRC. 21
Crimes against humanity have also featured in the jurisdiction of ‘hybrid’
tribunals that contain a mixture of international law and national law elements.
The Sierra Leone Special Court, established in 2002 pursuant to an agreement
between Sierra Leone and the UN, includes crimes against humanity as a part of
the Special Court’s jurisdiction. 22 Several defendants have been indicted and
some convicted by the Special Court for crimes against humanity, including the
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. 23
Special courts have been set up within a few national legal systems (at times
with international judges participating) and some of these courts have exercised
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. For example, the East Timor Special
Panels, established in 2000, had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity
committed between January and October 1999 in East Timor. 24 The relevant
language of that tribunal’s statute was almost a verbatim repetition of art 7 of the
Rome Statute, and the Special Panels convicted several defendants for crimes
against humanity. Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, established by Cambodia in 2001, included within art 5 of its statute
‘the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed crimes against
humanity’, 25 leading to the trial of certain defendants for such crimes.
Finally, crimes against humanity have also featured at times in the
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and tribunals, such as the

20 Prosecutor v Katanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International Criminal

Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008) 126–7 [396].
21 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No

ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014) 155 [436], 158 [443]–[444].
22 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the

Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS
137 (entered into force 12 April 2002); Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915 (2000) enclosure
(‘Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’).
23 Prosecutor v Taylor (Judgment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case
No SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September 2013). See René van der Wolf (ed), The Case against
Charles Taylor (International Courts Association, 2013).
24 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences,
UN Doc UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000) s 5.
25 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 2004
(Cambodia) art 5.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights 26 and the European Court of Human
Rights. 27
In light of such historical developments, it is now well-settled that, under
international law, criminal responsibility attaches to an individual for committing
crimes against humanity, including those occurring in NIACs. As the ICTY Trial
Chamber in the Tadić case indicated, ‘since the Nürnberg Charter, the
customary status of the prohibition against crimes against humanity and the
attribution of individual criminal responsibility for their commission have not
been seriously questioned’. 28
B

National Courts

These are impressive achievements with respect to international tribunals. But
how have crimes against humanity fared under national law?
The national laws of several states do address in some fashion crimes against
humanity, thereby allowing national prosecutions falling within the scope of
those laws. Indeed, in the decades following Nürnberg, various national
prosecutions occurred, such as the Eichmann and Demjanjuk cases in Israel, the
Menten case in the Netherlands, the Barbie and Touvier cases in France and the
Finta, Mugesera and Munyaneza cases in Canada. 29 Crimes against humanity
typically arose in the context of criminal prosecutions, but they also arose in the
context of extradition or immigration proceedings.
In recent years, under the influence of the Rome Statute, many states have
adopted or amended national laws that criminalise crimes against humanity. For
example, I note that there are two federal statutes in Australia that concern
prosecutions in Australia for crimes against humanity: (1) the Criminal Code Act
of 1995; 30 and (2) the International Criminal Court (Consequential
Amendments) Act of 2002. 31 Together, the two statutes provide that Australian
courts have jurisdiction in cases involving crimes against humanity, even if the
offences are also crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Further, jurisdiction is
available whether or not the offence was committed in Australia, but the

26 See, eg, Javier Dondé Matute, ‘Los elementos contextuales de los crímenes de lesa

27
28
29

30
31

humanidad y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos’ [Contextual Elements of
Crimes against Humanity in the Inter-American Court] in Kai Ambos, Ezequiel Malarino
and Gisela Elsner (eds), Sistema Interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos y
Derecho Penal internacional [Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights
and International Criminal Law] (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011) vol 2, 205.
See, eg, Korbely v Hungary (Judgment) [2008] IV Eur Court HR 299, 348 [82].
Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Trial Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997) 224 [623].
A-G (Israel) v Eichmann [Israel Supreme Court] (appeal judgment) No 336/51 (29 May
1962); State of Israel v Ivan (John) Demjanjuk [Jerusalem District Court] (trial judgment)
No 373/86 (18 April 1988); Ivan (John) Demjanjuk v State of Israel [Israel Supreme Court]
(appeal judgment) No 347/88 (29 July 1993); Menten v Federal Republic of Germany
(1987) 101 ILR 443 [The Hague Court of Appeal]; Cour de cassation [French Court of
Cassation], 85-95166, 20 December 1985; Cour de cassation [French Court of Cassation],
92-82409, 27 November 1992; R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701; Minister of Citizen and
Immigration v Mugesera [2005] 2 SCR 100; Munyaneza v The Queen [2014] QCCA 906
(Quebec Court of Appeal).
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth).
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Attorney-General must give permission for charges to be brought under the
relevant provisions.
Various studies have attempted to compile and analyse the scope of such
national laws, both in terms of the substance of the crimes and the circumstances
when jurisdiction may be exercised over such crimes. For example, in 2013 the
George Washington University Human Rights Clinic in Washington DC
published a study entitled ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National
Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity and Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction’, 32 which reached several interesting conclusions, some of which I
would like to share with you.
First, the 2013 study canvassed the findings of earlier studies and found that,
when read collectively, those earlier studies indicated that:
•
•

At best, 54 per cent of UN member states have some form of national
law relating to crimes against humanity; 33 and
At best, 66 per cent of Rome Statute parties have some form of
national law relating to crimes against humanity. 34

Secondly, the 2013 study undertook an in-depth, qualitative review of the
national laws of a sample of 83 states. That review concluded that only 41 per
cent of states in the sample actually possessed a national law specifically on
‘crimes against humanity’. 35 Of the 58 Rome Statute parties within the sample of
83 states, the review indicated that just 48 per cent of them possessed a national
law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’.
Thirdly, for the 34 states that possessed a national law specifically on ‘crimes
against humanity’, the 2013 study analysed closely the provisions of those laws.
Of those states, only 29 per cent adopted verbatim the text of art 7 of the Rome
Statute when defining the crime. 36 As such, of the 83 states within the sample,
only about 12 per cent adopted the formulation of Rome Statute art 7 in its
entirety. Instead, most of the 34 states possessing a national law on ‘crimes
against humanity’ deviated from the language of art 7, some in a very substantial
way.
Finally, the 2013 study analysed whether the 34 states that possess a national
law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’ could exercise jurisdiction over a
non-national offender who commits the crime abroad against non-nationals. The
study concluded that only about 25 per cent of the states within the sample were
able to exercise such jurisdiction over ‘crimes against humanity’. Further, of the
58 Rome Statute parties within the sample, only 33 per cent possess a national

32 International Human Rights Law Clinic, ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National

33
34
35
36

Legislation relating to Crimes against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (Report,
George Washington University Law School, July 2013), updated and reprinted in part in
Arturo J Carrillo and Annalise K Nelson, ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National
Legislation relating to Crimes Against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (2014) 46
George Washington International Law Review 481.
Ibid 487.
Ibid 488.
Ibid 493.
Ibid 492.
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law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’ and are able to exercise such
jurisdiction. 37
This unevenness in the adoption of national laws relating to crimes against
humanity has collateral consequences with respect to interstate cooperation in
seeking to sanction offences. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on
mutual legal assistance and on extradition typically require that the offence at
issue be criminalised in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and requested
states (a requirement referred to as ‘double criminality’); if their respective
national laws are not comparable, then cooperation usually is not required. With
a large number of states having no national law on crimes against humanity, and
with significant discrepancies among the national laws of states that have
criminalised the offence, there exist at present considerable impediments to
interstate cooperation.
Further, the absence in most states of national laws that allow for the exercise
of jurisdiction over non-nationals for crimes against humanity inflicted upon
non-nationals abroad means that offenders often may seek sanctuary by moving
to a state unconnected with the crime. Even in circumstances in which states
have adopted harmonious national laws on crimes against humanity, there may
exist no treaty obligation as between the states to cooperate with respect to the
offence, including by way of an obligation to extradite or prosecute the offender.
III

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S PROJECT ON CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY

Principally to address this unevenness in national laws, in July 2014 the
International Law Commission (‘the Commission’) embarked on a project to
develop draft articles for what might become a new convention on the prevention
and punishment of crimes against humanity. 38 The Commission appointed me to
serve as special rapporteur for the project.
The project will involve preparing a series of draft articles beginning in the
summer of 2015 and continuing for the next few years, which will likely contain
at least the following elements:
•
•
•

•
•

An obligation upon states to prevent crimes against humanity;
An obligation upon states to incorporate crimes against humanity
into their national law;
An obligation upon states to exercise jurisdiction over acts that
constitute crimes against humanity when they occur in their territory
or by their nationals, or when an offender who allegedly committed
such crimes turns up in their territory;
An obligation upon states to either submit the offender to prosecution
or to extradite the offender (aut dedere aut judicare);
An obligation upon states to engage in mutual legal assistance with
other states; and

37 Ibid 505–13.
38 See International Law Commision, Report of the International Law Commission on the

Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/69/10 (5
May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014) 247 [266]. See also Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, GA Res 69/118, 69th sess, Agenda Item
78, UN Doc A/RES/69/118 (18 December 2014) para 7.
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An obligation to go to international dispute resolution in the event of
a disagreement between states as to the application or interpretation
of the agreement.

One reason for such a convention is to help fill a gap not just in national laws
but in our existing treaty regimes — we have a Genocide Convention 39 to
address genocide and we have the 1949 Geneva Conventions 40 to address serious
war crimes, but we have no convention focused on nationalisation of crimes
against humanity, nor on interstate cooperation with respect to such crimes.
When embarking on this project, one issue that the Commission considered
was how such a convention would relate to the Rome Statute. Certainly, a
convention on crimes against humanity should avoid any conflicts with the Rome
Statute, given the large number of states that have adhered to it, and should draw
upon the language of the Rome Statute, as well as associated instruments and
jurisprudence, whenever appropriate.
For example, in the event that a state party to the Rome Statute receives a
request from the ICC for the surrender of a person to the ICC and also receives a
request from another state for extradition of the person pursuant to the proposed
convention, art 90 of the Rome Statute provides a procedure to resolve the
competing requests. The draft articles of the proposed convention should be
crafted to ensure that states party to the Rome Statute can follow that procedure
even after joining the convention on crimes against humanity.
Moreover, in several ways the adoption of a convention could promote
desirable objectives not addressed in the Rome Statute, while simultaneously
supporting the mandate of the ICC.
First, the Rome Statute regulates relations between its states party and the
ICC, but does not regulate matters among the parties themselves (nor among
parties and non-parties). In other words, the Rome Statute is focused on the
‘vertical’ relationship of states to the ICC, but not the ‘horizontal’ relationship of
interstate cooperation. Part IX of the Rome Statute on ‘International Cooperation
and Judicial Assistance’ implicitly acknowledges that interstate cooperation on
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC should continue to operate outside the
Rome Statute, but does not direct itself to the regulation of that cooperation. A
convention on crimes against humanity could expressly address interstate
cooperation on the investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment in
national legal systems of persons who commit crimes against humanity, an
objective fully consistent with the Rome Statute’s object and purpose.
Secondly, the ICC is focused upon punishment of persons for the crimes
within its jurisdiction, not upon steps that should be taken by states to prevent
39 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, open for signature

9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
40 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in

Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into
force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, open for signature 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950).
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such crimes before they happen. A new convention on crimes against humanity
could include obligations relating to prevention that draw upon comparable
obligations in other treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the
Convention against Torture, 41 as well as recent jurisprudence, such as the
International Court of Justice’s decisions in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia
and Montenegro and Croatia v Serbia genocide cases. 42 As such, a convention
on crimes against humanity could clarify a state’s obligation to prevent crimes
against humanity and provide a basis for holding states accountable in that
regard.
Thirdly, while the ICC is a key international institution for prosecution of
high-level persons who commit these crimes, the ICC was not designed (nor
given the resources) to prosecute all persons responsible for crimes against
humanity. Rather, the ICC is predicated on the notion that, in the first instance,
national jurisdictions are the proper place for prosecution in the event that
appropriate national laws are in place (the principle of complementarity). 43
Further, in some circumstances the ICC may wish to transfer a suspect in its
custody for prosecution in a national jurisdiction, but may be unable to do so if
the national jurisdiction is not capable of charging the suspect with crimes
against humanity. Given that the ICC does not have the capacity to prosecute all
persons responsible for crimes against humanity, or to strengthen national legal
systems in this regard, a new convention could help reinforce the ICC by
developing greater capacity at the national level for prevention and punishment
of such crimes.
Fourthly, and relatedly, a convention on crimes against humanity would
require the enactment of national laws that criminalise crimes against humanity
which, as I have discussed, currently many states have not done, including many
states party to the Rome Statute.
As such, rather than conflict with other treaty regimes, a well-designed
convention on crimes against humanity could help fill a gap in existing treaty
regimes and, in doing so, simultaneously reinforce those regimes.
IV

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by noting that, when one looks across the globe at various
areas of conflict, it is disheartening to see that crimes against humanity appear to
be occurring in many places, most notably in NIACs. The system of international
law has come very far in defining what is meant by such crimes and by
establishing international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over such crimes.
41 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26
June 1987).
42 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep
43; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (Judgment) (International Court of Justice, General List No
118, 3 February 2015).
43 See Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); Jann K Kleffner,
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford
University Press, 2008).
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But much remains to be done in developing national laws, in promoting
cooperation among states for investigation, prosecution or extradition of
offenders and in finding ways to help prevent such crimes from occurring ab
initio. Perhaps a new convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity — such as currently exist for genocide and serious war
crimes — would help in addressing such problems. Indeed, a global convention
on prevention, punishment and interstate cooperation with respect to crimes
against humanity appears to be a missing piece in the current framework of
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international
human rights law. Such a convention could help to further stigmatise such
egregious conduct, could draw further attention to the need for its prevention and
punishment and could help to harmonise national laws relating to such conduct,
thereby opening the door to more meaningful interstate cooperation on the
investigation, prosecution and extradition for such crimes.
Whether or not this initiative for a new convention is the means for doing so,
stopping crimes against humanity in non-international armed conflicts is one of
our signature challenges for the 21st century.

